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In The Supreme Court 
Of the State of Utah 
CARL JOHANSON and CLARA 
J. JOHANSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
6302 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, CUDAHY PACKING 
COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The complaint filed in the Third District Court on 
September 26, 1939, was demurred to by defendant on 
the ground that it did not state a cause of action in favor 
of plaintiffs and agaiust defendant. This demurrer 
was sustained. Plaintiffs declined to plead further and 
judgment was entered in favor of defendant. From that 
judgmnet plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. 
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The complaint in substance alleges that Robert Jo-
hanson, son of plaintiffs, was instantly killed on J nne 3, 
1938, by an electric shock coming from electric wires 
owned and maintained by defendant; that his death was 
caused by the negligence of the defendant; that at the 
time of his death he was working in the course of his em-
ployment ; that the employer was the Royal Crystal Salt 
Company and that the insurance carrier was the London 
Guaranty & Accident Company, Ltd.; that the dependent 
father and mother applied to the Industrial Commission 
for and were awarded workmen's compensation in the 
sum of approximately $2500; that the insurance carrier 
became subrogated to the rights of the plaintiffs in the 
cause of action alleged against the defendant under and 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 42-1-58, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933; that on the 29th day of August, 
1939, the insurance carrier, ''for a valuable considera-
tion, executed and delivered to the plaintiffs herein a 
waiver of said right of subrogation and an assignment 
of its cause of action against the said defendant herein, 
and the plaintiffs are now the owners of said cause of 
action against the defendants, with full right to bring 
and prosecute this action." (See complaint, Tr. P. 3; 
appellants' brief, P. 6). 
It will be noticed it is nowhere alleged in the com-
plaint that the insurance carrier has paid the compensa-
tion awarded, or any part of the same. In the Trial 
Court the defendant contended, and contends in this 
Court, that the waiver and assignment alleged in the 
complaint are null and void. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CIVIL ACTION FOR DEATH CAUSED BY 
TORTIOUS ACT IS THE CREATURE OF STAT-
UTE; IT DID NOT EXIST AT COMMON LAW. 
THE STATUTE DOES NOT CREATE A 
PROPERTY RIGHT 
Higgins vs. Butcher (1607) Yelverton, 89. 
Baker vs. Bolton (1808), 1 Campbell, 493 . 
.Admiralty Commissioners vs. 8. B . .Amerika 
( 1917) A. C. 38; s. c. Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1917B, 
P. 887. 
Mobile Life Ins. Co. vs. Brame (1878) 95 U. 
S. 754; 24 L. Ed. 580. 
Thomas vs. Union Pacific Coal Co. (1875) 1 
Utah, 232. 
The rule announced by these cases may be put in 
the language of Lord Ellenborough, used in 1808, as 
follows: 
"In a civil court the death of a human being 
cannot be complained of as an injury.'' 
In the Brame case, supra, the United States Su-
preme Court said of this rule: 
''It is impossible to speak of it as a propo-
sition open to question.'' 
STATrrrES ENACTED 
"Lord Campbell's Act," as it has been called, en-
acted by the English Parliament in 1846, did not a~olish 
the rule of Baker vs. Bolton but created a new right or 
remedy by way of exception to that rule. This Act be-
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came quite general as a statute in our various states. 
Quite a number of states, however, have made the action 
of a person injured survive his death. This was never 
true in Utah. At least fifteen states, among which are 
Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma and Montana, have such survivor statutes. 
The first death statute of Utah was passed Febru-
ary 29, 1874. (Compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, P. 397). 
This statute was repealed and Section 3179 of the Laws 
.of 1888 was substituted in 1884. This section remained 
in force up to and after statehood, and became Section 
2912 of the Revised Statutes of 1898. 
The constitution of Utah, Article XVI, Section 5, 
provided: 
''The right of action to recover damages for 
injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogat-
ed, and the amount recoverable shall not be sub-
ject to any statutory limitation.'' 
This Constitutional provision was amended Novem-
ber 2, 1920, adding to the above language, ''except in 
cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death 
is provided for by law." 
In the year 1921 Utah made extensive amendments 
of its Workmen's Compensation Law. (See Chapter 67 
of Laws of Utah, 1921, P. 165). In Section 3133 of this 
Chapter 67 it was provided: 
''If an employee under this Act be injured 
or killed while in the course of his employment 
by another not in the same employment, he or 
his dependents in case of death, shall be entitled 
to compensation and to no other remedy unless 
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the employer be subject to the provisions of Sec-
tion 3129 and 3130. No employee or the depen-
dents in case of death shall be granted compen-
sation in such case unless such employee or his 
dependents, as the case may be, shall assign any 
cause of action existing against the person re-
sponsible for or causing the injury or death to 
the state insurance fund, if compensation is pay-
able therefrom, and otherwise to the person or 
association or corporation liable for the payment 
of such compensation. And such cause of action 
is by this section made assignable, whether it be 
for injury or death, and the dependents or the 
personal representative and not the heirs in such 
case shall have the right and power to make a 
full and exclusive assignment notwithstanding 
Sections 6504 and 6505, Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1917. " (Italics ours). 
In the year 1933 the above section was amended, 
and Section 42-1-58 of the Revised Statutes of 1933 took 
the place of the above Section 3133. Section 42-1-58 
was made to read : 
''When any InJury for which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been caused 
by the wrongful act of a third person, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may 
at their option claim compensation under this 
title or have their action for damages against 
such third person; and, if compensation is claimed 
and awarded, the employer or insurance carrier 
having paid the compensation shall be subrogated 
to the rights of such employee or his dependents 
to recover against such third person; provided, if 
such recovery shall be in excess of the amount of 
the compensation awarded and paid, then such 
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excess, less the reasonable expenses of the action, 
shall be paid to· the employee or his dependents.'' 
Section 2912 of the Revised Statutes of 1898 became 
Section 6505 of the Compiled Laws of 1917. In 1933 
said Section became Section 104-3-11 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1933, and was made to read: 
''Except as provided in chapter 1, of Title 42, 
when the death of a person not a minor is caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his 
heirs or his personal represntatives for the ben-
efit of his heirs, may maintain an action for dam-
ages against the person causing the death, or, if 
such person is employed by another who is re-
sponsible for his conduct, then also against such 
other person. If such adult person has a guard-
ian at the time of his death, only one action can 
be maintained for the injury to or death of such 
person, and such action may be brought by either 
the personal representatives of such adult de-
ceased person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by 
such guardian for the benefit of the heirs as pro-
vided in the next preceding section. In every 
action under this and the next preceding section 
such damages may be given as under all the cir-
cumstances of the case may be just:'' 
It will be noticed that in Section 3133 of Chapter 
67 of the Laws of 1921 the legislature of this state com-
menced to make a distinction as between ''the depen-
dents" of an employee suffering death in the course 
of his employment and ''the heirs'' of such a person. 
Said distinction is preserved in Section 42-1-58 of the 
Revised Statutes of 1933. 
After the cause of action, if any, accrued in the case 
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at bar, the legislature of Utah in 1939 amended Section 
42-1-58 to read as follows: 
''When any injury for which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been caused 
by the wrongful act of another person not in the 
same employment, the injured employee, or in 
case of death his dependents, may at their option 
claim compensation under this title or have their 
action for damages against such third person; 
and, if compensation is claimed and awarded, the 
employer or insurance carrier having paid the 
compensation shall be subrogated to the rights of 
such employee or his dependents to recover 
against such third person; provided, if such re-
covery shall be in excess of the amount of the 
compensation awarded and paid, then ·such ex-
cess, less the reasonable expenses of the action, 
shall be paid to the employee or his dependents. 
Before being required to pay any compensation 
or other benefits as provided in this title the em-
ployer or insurance carrier may require the em-
ployee or in case of death his dependents to make 
a written assignment of any cause of action ex-
isting against the third person to such employer 
or insurance carrier as the case may be.'' (Laws 
of Utah, 1939, P. 70). 
The conclusion seems to be compelled that a man 
has no pecuniary interest in his own life, and that his 
life has no pecuniary or money value either to himself 
or his estate, and that his relatives and dependents have 
only such an interest as is strictly personal to each of 
them. 
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POINT II 
ONLY THE PERSONS NAMED IN THE STATUTE 
CREATING THE RIGHT AND REMEDY FOR THE 
RECOVERY 0 F DAMAGES F 0 R TORTIOUS 
DEATH MAY INSTITUTE AND MAINTAIN THE 
ACTION CREATED BY THE STATUTE. 
6 Standard Encyc. of Procedure, P. 385. 
Mobile Life Ins. Co. vs. Brame (1878) 95 U. 
S. 754; 24 L. Ed. 580. 
Thorpe vs. Union Pacific Coal Co., 24 Utah, 
475; 68 Pac. 145 (1902). 
These authorities establish the proposition that 
when the legislature created a right of action to recover 
damages for injuries resulting in the death of the per-
son injured, the action must be brought in the name of 
the person to whom the right is given by the statutes of 
the state where the injuries were inflicted. 
POINT III 
THE ACTION, BEING STATUTORY AND PERSON-
AL IN ITS NATURE, CANNOT AND DOES NOT 
SURVIVE THE DEATH OF EITHER ITS OWNER 
OR THE WRONGDOER. IT DOES NOT PASS UPON 
THE DEATH OF THAT OWNER TO THE PERSON-
AL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OWNER'S ES-
TATE, AND THEREFORE IT IS NOT ASSIGN-
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ABLE UNDER THE TEST LAID DOWN BY THE 
SUPRE1IE COURT OF THIS STATE AND 
RECOGNIZED GENERALLY THROUGHOUT 
THE UNITED STATES. 
The survivability of actions is definitely defined by 
the statutes of Utah, Sections 102-11-5, 102-11-6 and 
102-11-7: 
'' 102-11-5. Actions for the recovery of any 
property, real or personal, or for the possession 
thereof, or to quiet title thereto, or to determine 
any adverse claim thereon, and all actions found-
ed upon contracts, may be maintained by and 
against executors and administrators in all cases 
in which the same might have been maintained 
by or against their respective testators or in-
intestates.'' 
"102-11-6. Executors and administrators 
may maintain actions against any person who 
has wasted, destroyed, taken or carried away, or 
converted to his own use, the goods of their tes-
tators or intestates in his lifetime. They may 
also maintain actions for trespass committed on 
real estate of the decedent in his lifetime.'' 
"102-11-7. Any person or his personal rep-
resentative may maintain an action against the 
executor or administrator of any testator or in-
testate, who in his lifetime has wasted, destroyed, 
taken or carried away, or converted to his own 
use, the goods or chattels of any such person, or 
committed any trespass on the real estate of such 
person.'' 
These statutes have been in force in this state ever 
since statehood, and were in force prior thereto, having 
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been taken from the probate code of the State of Cali-
fornia. 
Brown vs. D. R. Wightman, Administrator 
of V. C. Wightm(J!YI, (1915), 47 Utah, 31; 151 
Pac. 366 ; L. R. A. 1916A, 1140. 
Clark vs. Goodwin, Administrator, (1915 ), 
170 Cal. 327 150 Pac. 357; L. R. A. 1916A, 1142. 
In the case of Brown vs. Wightman, supra, it was 
held that the suicide of one who had made a malicious 
assault upon the plaintiff prevented recovery by the 
plaintiff. 
In the case of Clark vs. Goodwin from California, 
it was held that the death of the wrongdoer Goodwin, 
who had killed and murdered Clark, prevented any re-
covery by the widow of Clark. 
Candland vs. Mellon (1915) 46 Utah, 519; 
151 Pac. 341. 
In this Candland case plaintiff in her lifetime had 
obtained judgment against the defendent. After that 
judgment became final in the District Court the plain-
tiff died and her administrator was substituted on ap-
peal. The judgment of the Trial Court was reversed by 
this Court, and when that judgment was reversed for 
errors committed by the Trial Court it was held that 
the cause of action did not survive the death of the or-
iginal plaintiff. 
The Court said: 
''As we view the matter, we think the cause 
does not survive. It was, however, merged in the 
judgment which, had it not been disturbed, could 
have been enforced, but when the judgment is 
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gone the cause is gone." (Citing Mason vs. Un-
ion Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah, 77; 24 Pac. 796). 
The test of assignability is survivability. 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. vs. Denver and 
Rio Grande Ry. (1913), 44 Utah 26; 137 Pac. 653. 
Lawler vs. Jennings (1898), 18 Utah, 35; 55 
Pac. 60. 
In Lawler vs. Jennings, supra, this Court said: 
''The general test applied in determining 
the assignability of a chose in action is whether 
or not it would survive and pass to the personal 
representative of a decedent. If it would so sur-
vive it may be assigned so as to pass an interest to 
the assignee, which he can enforce in his own 
name. If it does not so survive it is not assign-
able, either at law or in equity.'' 
In the National Union Fire Ins. Company case, su-
pra, this Court said. 
''The only test of assignability in this state 
is whether the cause of action survives and passes 
to the personal representative of a decedent.'' 
The appellants cite this case. It appeared that the 
defendant had negligently caused the destruction by 
fire of certain buildings situated upon the land of Min-
nie Witt; that these buildings had been insured by the 
National Company, and that company had paid certain 
insurance ; that she had assigned her claim against the 
Railroad Company to the Insurance Company. 
The Court held : 
''The assignability of the claim sued on is 
therefore indubitably established by our own stat-
ute.'' 
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It is difficult to see how this case can function for 
the benefit of the appellants in the case at bar. There 
never has been any statute in this state that provided 
for the survivability of actions for personal injuries, or 
actions for wrongful death, and consequently in the ab-
sence of express statute applying the test of survivability, 
such actions are not assignable. It does not make any 
difference whether the cause of action for death is con-
trolled exclusively by the provisions of Section 42-1-58 or 
by the provisions of the general death statute, Section 
104-3-11. 
POINT IV 
WHEN THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH AMENDED SECTION 3133 OF CHAPTER 6~1 
OF THE LAWS OF UTAH, 1921, AND ENACTED 
SECTION 42-1-58 OF THE REVISED STATUTES 
OF 1933, IT MANIFESTED A OLEAR LEGISLA-
TIVE INTENT TO PROHIBIT THE ASSIGNABIL-
ITY OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION REFERRED TO 
IN SECTION 42-1-58 
It will be noticed that the action against the third 
person who wrongfully or negligently injures or kills 
an employee while in the course of his employment with 
a master was made assignable by the provisions of the 
statute in force from the year 1921 until 1933. That 
section has been quoted in full, and it among other things 
provided ''and such cause of action is by this section 
made assignable, whether it be for injury or death.'' 
In 1933 the legislature adopted the revision of the 
statutes which became effective June 26, 1933, and it 
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.. repealed all acts of a general and permanent nature 
passed by the legislature of the State of Utah prior to 
its twentieth regular session, - specifically excepting, 
however, from such repeal certain specified provisions. 
Section 3133 of Chapter 67 of the Laws of 1921 was not 
within the excepted provisions, and was therefore re-
pealed. 
No more conclusive evidence could be offered of 
the legislative intent to destroy the assignable character 
of the cause of action in the case at bar than the express 
repeal of the provision above quoted, and the fact that 
the legislature in 1939 amended Section 42-1-58 of the 
Revised Statutes of 1933, requiring the employee, or, in 
.. case of death, his dependents, to make a written assign-
ment of any cause of action existing against the third 
person to such employer or insurance carrier, conclus-
ively shows that the legislature has not intended that 
such a cause of action should become property and sub-
ject to barter and sale. It is true that this amendment 
of 1939 was not in force at the time of the death of Robert 
Johanson. 
POINT V 
WHENEVER AN EMPLOYEE WAS KILLED 
WHILE WORKING IN THE COURSE OF HIS EM-
PLOY1IENT BY THE WRONGFUL ACT 0 F A 
THIRD PERSON, THEN THE DEPENDENTS OF 
THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE BECAME VESTED 
WITH ONE OF TWO ALTERNATIVE RIGHTS, 
VIZ: EITHER TO CLAIM COMPENSATION FROM 
THE EMPLOYER OR INSURANCE CARRIER, OR 
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TO SUE AND RECOVER DAMAGES FROM THE 
THIRD PERSON WHO WRONGFULLY CAUSED 
THE DEATH OF THE EMPLOYEE 
It is plain from the provisions of Section 42-1-58 of 
the Revised Statutes of 1933 that the dependents of a 
deceased employee who had been killed in the course 
of his employment by the negligent act or wrong of a 
third person were compelled to elect which of the two 
rights and remedies they would take. If these depen-
dents applied for and were awarded compensation from 
the master, then the master or insurance carrier having 
paid that compensation became vested with whatever 
right existed as against the third person who wrongfully 
or negligently caused the death of the employee. The 
dependents, after having made that election, had no fur-
ther interest in the cause of action against the third 
person. The employer or insurance carrier, if there was 
one, was vested with the entire cause of action and com-
plete control of it. It is true that if the employer or in-
surance carrier recovered against the third person a 
greater amount than was necessary to make reimburse-
ment of the compensation paid, then the excess, less reas-
onable expenses, was turned over to the dependents. 
Those dependents, having declined the right proferred 
by the statute by accepting the award of compensation, 
never acquired or had any interest in the surplus, if any, 
over and above the amount of compensation paid and 
reasonable expenses of making recovery until the action 
had been merged into the judgment of recovery. 
Lang vs. Brooklyn City R. Co. (1928), 217 
N.Y. S. 277. 
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Same case affirmed by N. Y. Court of Ap-
peals, 247 N. Y. 551; 161 N. E. 178. 
(In this case Chief Justice Cardozo and Justices 
Pond, Lehman and Kellogg rendered an opinion sustain-
ing the law as stated.) 
Bruso's Case (1936), 
(2d) 308. 
Mass. ; 4 N. E. 
In this case the Massachusetts Supreme Court was 
construing a provision in some respects similar to Sec-
tion 42-1-58. Chief Justice Rugg, speaking for the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, said : 
''The provisions of Section 15, allowing an 
insurer which has paid compensation to an em-
ployee injured by the tortious conduct of some 
third person other than the employer, to enforce 
the liability of such third person, fix the propor-
tions of the amount recovered to be paid to the 
employee and to be retained by the insure·r. 
When such an employee accepts compensation 
under the act, he waives all right of action against 
such third person.'' 
Holmes vs. Henry Jennings Co. (1921), 7 
Fed. (2d) 231. 
The United States District Court for the District 
of Oregon held : 
''When a party has two remedies inconsistent 
with each other, any decisive act by him done on 
the knowledge of his rights and facts determine 
his election. ' ' 
In the Lang case above cited it was held: 
''Compensation insurance _carrier cannot re-
assign to injured employee surplus of its recovery 
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against third person negligently causing InJury 
over compensation paid.'' 
Hunt vs. Bank Line, 35 Fed. (2d) 136 (1929). 
In this case the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held: 
''Stevedore, who accepted compensation for 
his injuries under Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, and who requested 
his employer to bring suit against steamship line 
for damages for negligence in accordance with 
Sec. 33, held not entitled, on employer's refusal, 
to maintain suit for damages in his own name, 
since acceptance of compensation was election not 
to sue for damages." 
In the course of his opinion Circuit Judge Parker 
said: 
"We think it clear, in the light of other pro-
visions which we have discussed, that this was 
not intended to give to the employee who has ac-
cepted compensation any right or interest in, or 
control over, the cause of action which is assigned 
by the act to the employer. It is the employer, 
to whom the cause of action is assigned upon pay-
ment of compensation, who is given the right of 
deciding whether he will hazard the costs and ex-
penses of suit. It is the employer who is given 
the power to determine whether a compromise 
shall be accepted or not. And the employee, hav-
ing accepted the compensation which the law has 
fixed, has no further interest in the matter, unless 
the employer decides to sue and succeeds in re-
covering more than is necessary for his reim-
bursement. Then, and not until then, the interest 
of such employee arises. And this is given by the 
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statute to the employee, not, we think, because 
he is deemed to ha,·e any interest in the cause of 
action, but to avoid the unseemly spectacle of the 
employer realizing· a profit from his injury.'' 
It is proper to say that the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah has held that these plain-
iffs could not maintain this action. (See Johanson vs. 
Cudahy Packing Company, Civil No. 11, minute entry 
November 30, 1938. Files Clerk's office, United States 
District Court for the District of Utah). 
POINT VI 
NO AUTHORITY CITED BY THE APPELLANTS IN 
THEIR BRIEF SUSTAINS THE VALIDITY OF 
THE ALLEGED ASSIGNMENT OR WAIVER. 
The appellants apparently undertake to get some 
benefit out of the statement that the insurance carrier 
waived its right to subrogation. Full effect can be given 
to any allegPd waiver of that right and yet such waiver 
cannot vest the ownership of the cause of action, if one 
is alleged, in the plaintiffs, appellants here. It is settled 
law that under such a statute as Section 42-1-58 the de-
pendents may have either compensation against the em-
ployer or insurance carrier, or may sue the third person 
who tortiously caused the death of the employee. The 
election to take one precludes the taking of the other. 
The application for compensation and the accept-
ance of an award is an unequivocal election to take the 
compensation and to forego and decline the cause of ac-
tion against the third person, tor?~ The mere 
fact that the insurance carrier ~to proceed 
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against the third person, or refused to exercise the right 
which it acquired under the statute, would not give the 
dependents any right to proceed on such cause of action. 
Before they could have that right it must be transferred 
to them by a valid assignment, and it is the contention 
of the respondent here that the right of the action can-
not be assigned. The law does not per!¢t such an as-
signment. There is sound public policy ~t the pro-
hibition of assignment. If such action were once made 
the subject of barter and sale, then some of the purposes 
of the Workmen's Compensation law might be defeated. 
A right of action for a personal tort is not property, 
and therefore cannot be sold and transferred. It may 
result in property by recovery. The judgment, when 
once made, could be assigned, but the assignment of the 
judgment does not operate to assign the right of action 
which might lead to judgment. I refer to an old case 
decided by a very able judge, Gibson vs. Gibson (1877); 
43 Wis. 23; 28 Am. Rep. 527. 
Now, let us examine the authorities cited by the 
appellants, and again let it be affirmed that not one of 
those cases is in point. The appellants cite: 
McGarbey vs. Independent Oil and Gas Co. 
(1914) 156 Wis. 580; 146 N. W. 895. 
Saudek vs. Milwaukee Electric Co. (1916), 163 
Wis. 109; 157 N. W. 579. 
Frankfort Gen. Ins. Co. vs. City of Milwau-
kee (1916), 164 Wis. 77; 159 U. W. 581. 
Martell vs. Kutcher (1927) Wis. 
w. 522. 
; 216 N. 
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Swanson vs. Lake Superior Terminal and 
Transfer Co. (1928) Wis. ; 219 N. W. 274. 
Theby vs. Wisconsin Power and Light Co. 
(1929) Wis. 222 N. W. 826. 
Same case, 223 N. W. 791. 
The respondent cites from Wisconsin, Lehmann vs. 
Deuster teal. (1897), 95 Wis. 185; 70 N. W. 170; 37 L. R. 
A. 333. If anyone will examine the case reported in 37 L. 
R. A., 333, he will ascertain that causes of action for per-
sonal injury or death resulting from such injury have 
by express statute survived the death of either the per-
son injured or the wrongdoer from an early date in the 
State of Wisconsin, and for thJlr.eason such causes of 
action have been held assignable. The Wisconsin statute 
of 1887, Section 4253, so provides. Consequently we can 
eliminate from further consideration the Wisconsin cases 
cited by appellants. 
But counsel cite Globe Indemnity Co. vs. Toye 
Brothers (19:30), 129 So. 234; 14 La. App. 142 (Appell-
ants' brief, P. 25). 
Causes of action for personal injuries are made to 
survive by early Louisiana statute, Louisiana Civil Code, 
Section 2315. 
Payne vs. Georgetown Lumber Co. (1906), 
117 La. 983; 42 So. 475. 
By this statement a further consideration of the 
Louisiana case is unnecessary. 
Counsel cite Ridley vs. United Sash & Door Co. 
(1924), 98 Okla. 80; 224 Pac. 351. On 25 of appellants' 
brief it is said, in discussing this case: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
''It was held that the cause of action was as-
signable back to the employee by the insurance 
carrier who paid the compensation and that such 
employee could maintain the action.'' 
By the statement just quoted counsel for appellants 
create the suspicion that they have not read this Ridley 
case. The Western Union Telegraph Company was the 
employer involved in that case and it paid the compen-
sation. There was no insurance carrier. In the next 
place, no contention was made, or could have been made, 
relative to the assignability of the claim, and for that 
reason the Supreme Court of Oklahoma did not pass 
upon the validity of the assignment. 
For many years prior to the decision in the Ridley 
case rights of action for injuries to the person have sur-
vived the death of both the wrongdoer and the person 
injured, by reason of an express statute in full force and 
effect in the State of Oklahoma. (See Sections 5943 and 
5944 of the Compiled Laws of Oklahoma, 1909.) 
St. Louis and San Francisco R. R. Co. vs. 
Goode (1914) 42 Okla. 784; 142 Pac. 1185; L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 1915E. 
It is there pointed out that Section 5943 of the Okla-
homa statute among other things provided for the sur-
vival of causes of action for any injury to the person, 
and, of course, if such causes of action survive, then they 
are in a sense property, and of course can be assigned 
under the test generally recognized. 
The cases from the Supreme Court of Nebraska, to-
wit: Muncaster vs. Graham Ice Cream Co., (1919), 103 
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Neb. 379, 17~ N. \V. 5~, and Thomas vs. Otis Elevator Co. 
(1919), 103 Xeb. 401, 172 N. W. 53, are of no value in the 
determination of the question involved in the case at bar, 
because the Nebraska statute permits either the employer 
paying the compensation or the employee to sue, and 
where the employer has settled with the employee and 
refused to proceed further then the plaintiff has under 
this statute of Nebraska a right to proceed. 
California case: Morris vs. Standard Oil Co. (1926), 
200 Cal. 210, 252 Pac. 605. If this case is to have any effect 
at all, it is an authority in favor of the respondent. In 
rendering the opinion, Chief Justice Waste pointed out 
that the claim assigned was not to be confused with claims 
that were peculiarly personal causes of action, saying: 
"It must not be confused with those peculiar-
ly personal causes of action arising out of injuries 
to the body or feelings of the person injured, 
which are not assignable.'' 
In this Morris case the Ocean Accident Company, 
the insurance carrier, had paid out $800.64 for medical 
and hospital care and disability indemnity. This was 
compensation. Then when the injured plaintiff pro-
cured judgment against the Standard Oil company this 
award of the insurance company had by order of court 
been made a lien on the judgment obtained by the in-
jured plaintiff. In a settlement it had been assigned 
to the plaintiff. It was in effect a judgment, and it was 
assigned to the plaintiff in the settlement. When it was 
not paid it was held he had a right to recover. 
The cases from New Mexico, Arizona and Maine are 
all controlled by statutes entirely unlike those of Utah. 
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Perhaps some comment should be made concerning 
a number of Utah cases: 
Robinson vs. Industrial Commission (1928) 
72 Utah, 203 ; 269 Pac. 513. 
This case arose under Section 3133 of Chapter 67 
of the Laws of 1921. 
Robinson vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (1927) 
70 Utah, 441; 261 Pac. 9. 
Baker vs~ Wycoff (1938) 95 Utah, 199; 79 
Pac. (2d) 77. 
The cause of action involved in the Baker case was 
one for personal injuries existing at common law, where-
as, the cause of action claimed in the case at bar is a 
creature of statute. 
Industrial Commission of Utah vs. Wasatch 
Gradin.Q Co. (1932) 14 Pac. (2d) 988; 80 Utah 223. 
These cases will be of no great value to the Court 
but are cited for its convenience. 
An assignment was involved in the case of Fritz vs. 
Western Union Telegraph Co. (1903), 25 Utah, 263; 71 
Pac. 209. In that case the Court said: 
"We do not think that such assignment is 
or can be valid or of any effect.'' 
The action involved in the Fritz case was under the 
general death statute, Section 2912 of the Revised Stat-
utes of 1898. Under such a statute (and the authorities 
seem relevant here) the holdings have been almost unan-
imous that the beneficiary's interest is a mere expectan-
cy or an inchoate right, not a debt and not assignable, 
and that it abates with death of either the beneficiary 
or the wrongdoer. 
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Sanders, Adm,inistratrix, vs. Louisville and 
.i.Yash rille R. R. (1901), 111 Fed. 708. 
The opinion in this case was delivered by Circuit 
Judge Lurton and with him concurred Judges Day and 
Severns. It was in effect held that no one could be plain-
tiff in such an action but the one authorized by the terms 
of the statute, and that upon the death of a widow bene-
ficiary her right of action, if she had one, did not pass 
to her administrator. 
CONCLUSION 
From these authorities the following conclusions 
seem to result : 
1. The common law did not give any right to recover 
damages in a civil action for and on account of the death 
of a human being. That is the general rule today. 
2. In practically all of the states, including Utah, 
an exception has been created by statute to the above 
common law rule allowing a recovery to certain desig-
nated beneficiaries named in the statute. The right cre-
ated by statute in these beneficiaries is a personal one 
an does not survive either the death of such beneficiaries 
or that of the wrongdoer. 
3. The right to recover damages in a civil action 
under the statute is not assignable in the absence of ex-
press statute making it so. That right given by the stat-
ute is a mere personal expectancy. 
4. Section 42-1-58 of the Revised Statutes of 1933, 
prior to amendment in 1939, provided two rights of ac-
tion in a case where an employee was killed by the negli-
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gent or wrongful act or a third person while such em-
ployee was working in the course of his employment. 
These two rights were alternative, and the dependents 
of the deceased employee had the right to choose one of 
such rights, that is, such dependents could claim and 
have compensation under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. If such compensation was claimed and awarded, 
they did not have any right to sue the negligent third 
person. Or the dependents could prosecute an action 
against the negligent third person who caused the death 
of the employee. If the dependents took the compensa-
tion right they did not acquire the right to sue the third 
person. On the other hand, if compensation was claimed 
and awarded and paid by the employer or insurance car-
rier, that employer or insurance carrier then acquired 
the right to prosecute a civil action for damages for 
wrongful death against the negligent third person. 
5. It appearing that the plaintiffs have been award-
ed compensation in this case, they have no right to sue 
the defendant. That right belonged to the insurance 
carrier who paid the compensation. There is no allega-
tion of payment of that compensation in the complaint. 
6. The plaintiff's rights in the case at bar depend 
entirely upon the validity of the assignment alleged. 
The cause of action was not one that survived under the 
statute, and the assignment is absolutely void. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
MARLON E. WILSON, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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